

INTERNAL NETWORK PENETRATION TESTING

Report for:	
Date:	

This document contains confidential information about IT systems and network infrastructure of the client, as well as information about potential vulnerabilities and methods of their exploitation. This confidential information is for internal use by the client only and shall not be disclosed to third parties.



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Executive Summary

E-Discovery (Consultant) was contracted by ____ (Client) to conduct the penetration testing of their internal network.

This report presents the findings of the security assessment of CLIENT's network conducted between February 04th, 2018 – February 22nd, 2018.

The main subject of the security assessment is CLIENT's internal network.

Penetration test has the following objectives:

- identify technical and functional vulnerabilities;
- estimate their severity level (ease of use, impact on information systems, etc);
- draw up a prioritized list of recommendations to address identified weaknesses.


According to our research after performing the penetration testing, security rating of CLIENT's infrastructure was identified as **Medium**.



Scope of Security Assessment

The testing area includes all client's systems located in the company's office.

Network segments, which are the entry point during testing, were agreed with the client. Based on existing documentation, the following network segments were selected: CLIENT11, CLIENT11, CLIENT11. During testing, an extension of the list of tested networks was agreed with the client and the following were added to it: CLIENT11, CLIENT11, CLIENT11. Wired and wireless WiFi connection can be used to connect to the network (SSIDs correspond to the names of the segments).







vlan000	xxx.xxx.x.x
vlan000	xxx.xxx.x.x

Table 1 - Subnet IP addresses (provided by the client)

The network diagram and IP address table may differ from the actual network.



Methodology

The testing methodology is based on generally accepted industry-wide approaches to perform penetration testing for internal networks (NIST SP800-115, PTES, PCI Penetration Test Guidance).

Penetration tests include, at a minimum, checking for the following types of vulnerabilities:

- known vulnerabilities in operating systems and network components;
- using of insecure services;
- using of defaults credentials;
- vulnerable to MiTM components;
- testing to verify the effectiveness of segmentation tools;
- testing of WiFi network vulnerabilities.





Severity Definition

The level of criticality of each risk is determined based on the potential impact of loss from successful exploitation as well as ease of exploitation, existence of exploits in public access and other factors.

Severity	Description		
High	High-level vulnerabilities are easy to exploit and may provide an attacker with full control of the affected systems, also may lead to significant data loss or downtime. There are exploits or PoC available in public access.		
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are much harder to exploit and may not provide the same access to affected systems. No exploits or PoCs available in public access. Exploitation provides only very limited access.		
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities provide an attacker with information that may assist them in conducting subsequent attacks against target information systems or against other information systems, which belong to an organization. Exploitation is extremely difficult, or impact is minimal.		
Info 🗖	These vulnerabilities are informational and can be ignored.		




Summary of Findings

According to the following in-depth testing of the environment, CLIENT's infrastructure requires some improvements.

Value	Number of risks
High	3
Medium	1
Low	1
Info	3

Based on our understanding of the IT Infrastructure, as well as the nature of the vulnerabilities discovered, their exploitability, and the potential impact we have assessed the level of risk for your organization to be Medium.





Risk Level	Vulnerabilities	Affected system	Recommendations
High	Possibility of MITM attack	All vlan	Use VPN and AV with arp-spoofing protection functionality
High	Usage of Telnet Protocol	xxx.xxx.x.x	Replace Telnet with SSH
High	Unencrypted transmission of information over HTTP	xxx.xxx.x.x xxx.xxx.x.x xxx.xxx.x.x xxx.xxx.x.x	Use HTTPS or SSH
Medium	Usage of weak login credentials to access the database	xxx.xxx.x.x	Change username and password. Enable Firewall for Developers' PCs
Low	No valid certificate	xxx.xxx.x.x xxx.xxx.x.x	Install a valid certificate
Info	Weak MAC algorithms are used	xxx.xxx.x.x	Disable weak MAC algorithms
Info	Same passwords for Office (network10) and Management (network12)	vlanxx, vlanxx	Change password for the network Management (network12)
Info	Successful interception of handshake from networks: "network101", "network10"	vlanxx, vlanxx	Use WPA2 Enterprise





Key Findings

Possibility of MITM attack (Man in the middle)

#1	Description
chann contr disto	(man in the middle) - is a method of compromising a communication nel in which an attacker, having connected to the channel between factors, interferes in the transmission protocol, deleting or orting information.
Client	Server Protocol Usemame Password Valid login Login timestamp
<u> </u>	
ARP pois GROUP GROUP HTTP: HTTP: HTTP: HTTP:	added to the hosts list soning victims: 1 : ANY (all the hosts in the list) 2 : ANY (all the hosts in the list)
Reco	mmendations
•	Use VPN and AV with arp-spoofing protection functionality



Usage of the vulnerable Telnet Protocol

- Usage of the valuerable fethet flotocot
#2 Description
The Telnet service is launched on the remote host, which transmits the username and password in unencrypted form. An attacker could reveal login names and passwords by listening to traffic in the Telnet service.
Evidence
Location: vlan00 -> ipv4:xxx.xxx.x.x, mac:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx (Cisco Systems) vlan00 -> ipv4:xxx.xxx.x, mac:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx (Cisco Systems)
Result: Telnet Unencrypted Cleartext Login
Vulnerability Severity QoD Host Location Actions Telnet Unencrypted Cleartext Login Severity 70% 23/tcp (IANA: telnet) Severity
Telnet Unencrypted Cleartext Login Image: Cleartext Login 70% 23/tcp (IANA: telnet) Image: Cleartext Login Summary The remote host is running a Telnet service that allows cleartext logins over unencrypted connections. Image: Cleartext Login I
Vulnerability Detection Result Vulnerability was detected according to the Vulnerability Detection Method.
Impact An attacker can uncover login names and passwords by sniffing traffic to the Telnet service.
Solution Solution type: S Mitigation Replace Telnet with a protocol like SSH which supports encrypted connections.
Vulnerability Detection Method
Details: Telnet Unencrypted Cleartext Login Version used: 2019-06-06T07:39:31+0000
Recommendations
• Replace Telnet with SSH, which supports encrypted connections.



Unencrypted transmission over HTTP

#3 Description

An attacker could use this situation to compromise or eavesdrop on an HTTP connection between a client and server using the man in the middle attack to gain access to sensitive data, such as usernames or passwords

Evidence

Location:			
			(0) 0
vlan00 ->	ipv4:xxx.xxx.x.x,	mac:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	(Cisco Systems)
vlan00 ->	<pre>ipv4:xxx.xxx.x.x,</pre>	mac:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	(Cisco Systems)
vlan00 ->	ipv4:xxx.xxx.x.x,	mac:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	(D-Link)
vlan00 ->	ipv4:xxx.xxx.x.x,	mac:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	(DrayTek)

Result: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information via HTTP

Vulnerability	Severity	💿 🙆	Host	Location	Actions
Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information via HTTP	2 4.8 (Medit	um) 80%		80/tcp	2
Summary The host / application transmits sensitive information (username, passwords) in cleartext via HTTP.					HTTP.
Vulnerability Detection Result The following URLs requires Basic Authentication (URL:realm name): http:///:"level 15 access"					
Links:					
Recommendations					
 Use encrypted HT 	TPS traffic	or use SSH			



Usage of weak login credentials to access the DB				
#4 Description				
We managed to login as root with the password "123456".				
Evidence				
Location: vlan00 -> ipv4:x.xx, mac:00:00:00:00:00:00 (Apple)				
root@kali: ~				
root@kali:~ × root@kali:~ × • •				
<pre>root@kali:~# mysql ~h ·u root -p Enter password: Welcome to the MariaDB monitor. Commands end with ; or \g. Your MySQL connection id is 1867 Server version: 5.7.28 MySQL Community Server (GPL) Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle, MariaDB Corporation Ab and others.</pre>				
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.				
MySQL [(none)]> exit Bye root@kali:~#				
Recommendations				
 Set a non-standard username and change password to strong one Enable Firewall for Developers' PCs 				





No valid certificate

#5 Description
The certificate has expired.
Evidence
Location: vlan00 -> ipv4:xx.x.xx, mac:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx (Ubiquiti Networks) vlan00 -> ipv4:xxx.xxx, mac:xx:xx:xx:xx (Apple) Result: SSL/TLS: Certificate Expired
Vulnerability Severity Open Host Location Actions SSL/TLS: Certificate Expired Stot (Medium) 99% 443/tcp Stot (Medium) Summary The remote server's SSL/TLS certificate has already expired. Stot (Medium) Stot (Medium) Stot (Medium)
Vulnerability Detection Result The certificate of the remote service expired on 2020-01-02 00:03:10. Certificate details: subject: L=San Jose,ST=CA,C=US subject alternative names (SAN): None issued by .: serial:
valid from : valid until: fingerprint fingerprint Recommendations
• Install a valid certificate



Data exchange between clients of the guest network

#6 Description	
Possibility of data exchange between clients of the guest network	
Evidence	
Location: vlan23 -> ipv4:, SSID: network101 root@kali:~# ping :	
<pre>2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1001m rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 160.071/174.265/188.460/14.194 ms root@kali:~# ping</pre>	S
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1002m rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 44.588/55.741/66.894/11.153 ms	S
Recommendations	
• Disable the Client <u>To</u> Client Forwarding parameter in vlan00	



Weak MAC algorithms are used

#7 Description
The following weak client-server MAC algorithms are supported by the
remote service: HMAC-md0, HMAC-MD0-00, HMAC-SHA0-00.
Evidence
Location: vlan00 -> ipv4:xx.x.xx, mac:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx (D-Link International)
Result: SSH Weak MAC Algorithms Supported
Vulnerability 💽 🔝 Severity 🙆 QoD Host Location Actions
SSH Weak MAC Algorithms Supported 😒 2.6 (Low) 95% 22/tcp 🕃 🐮
Summary The remote SSH server is configured to allow weak MD5 and/or 96-bit MAC algorithms.
Vulnerability Detection Result
The following weak client-to-server MAC algorithms are supported by the remote service:
hmac-i hmac-i
Links:
Recommendations
Disable weak MAC algorithms



Same passwords for Office and Management networks

#8	Description
Same	passwords for Office and Management networks
Evid	ence
Offic	e and Management passwords
Reco	mmendations
•	Change password for the network Management (network00)





Appendix A. Services and Open Network Ports

At the time of testing, the following services were available in the WAN:

IP Address	Descrip tion	Open Ports	Statu s	Services	Version
		22/tcp	open	ssh	Cisco SSH 1.25
000.000.000 .000	WAN-port Cisco	23/tcp	open	telnet	Cisco IOS telnet
		2001/tcp	open	telnet	Cisco router telnetd
		4001/tcp	open	tcpwrapped	

Identified services and open network ports in landscape orientation here.



Appendix B. WiFi Testing

SSID	MAC Address	WPA/WPA2	WPS	Vendor	
network101	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-(TKIP CCMP) PSK-(TKIP CCMP)		Netcore Technology Inc.	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-(TKIP CCMP)	1.0	ALFA. INC.	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP PSK-CCMP		MERCURY COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES CO.LTD.	
network	XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX	PSK-(TKIP CCMP) PSK-(TKIP CCMP)			
[Hidden]	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.	
Vending	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP PSK-CCMP			
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP	1.0	Routerboard.com	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-(TKIP CCMP) PSK-(TKIP CCMP)			
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP	1.0	TP-LINK TECHNOLOGIES CO.LTD.	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	MGT-(TKIP CCMP) MGT-(TKIP CCMP)		TP-LINK TECHNOLOGIES CO.LTD.	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP		ASUSTek COMPUTER INC.	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP	1.0	ASUSTek COMPUTER INC.	
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP PSK-CCMP			



SSID	MAC Address	WPA/WPA2	WPS	Vendor
[Hidden]	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP		
[Hidden]	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP		
network	xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	PSK-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.
[Hidden]	ØE:EC:DA:XX:XX:XX	PSK-CCMP		
[Hidden]	B6:FB:E4:XX:XX:XX	PSK-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.
[Hidden]	0E:EC:DA:XX:XX:XX	MGT-CCMP		
network101	78:8A:20:XX:XX:XX	MGT-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.
network	FC:EC:DA:XX:XX:XX	PSK-(TKIP CCMP) PSK-(TKIP CCMP)		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.
[Hidden]	2E:EC:DA:XX:XX:XX	PSK-CCMP		
network101	74:83:C2:XX:XX:XX	PSK-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.
[Hidden]	FC:EC:DA:XX:XX:XX	PSK-CCMP		
[Hidden]	76:83:C2:XX:XX:XX	PSK-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.
[Hidden]	B6:FB:E4::XX:XX:X X	PSK-CCMP		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.
network	FE:EC:DA:XX:XX:XX	PSK-(TKIP CCMP) PSK-(TKIP CCMP)		Ubiquiti Networks Inc.



Networks for which handshake was intercepted

MAC Address	SSID	Пароль
xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	network10	****
xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	network10	****
xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	network101	****
xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	network12	****

Appendix C. Testing Segmentation Tools

The penetration testing verifies that segmentation controls/methods are operational and effective according to existing network diagram.

>	vlan00	vlan01	vlan02	vlan03	vlan04	vlan05
vlan00	+	-	-	+	-	-
vlan01	-	+	-	-	-	-
vlan02	+	+	+	+	+	+
vlan03	-	-	-	+	-	-